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The North Carolina Historic Preservation and Conservation Agreements
Act: Assessment and Implications for Historic Preservation
"The Eagle is preserved, not for its use, but for its beauty."'
INTRODUCTION
The 1979 session of the North Carolina General Assembly passed
the Historic Preservation and Conservation Agreements Act2 as one of
four Senate bills proposed to reform the state's historic preservation
law. 3 The bills were the product of a year's work by the Attorney Gen-
eral's Select Committee on Historic Preservation Legislation. Repre-
sentatives from the State. Department of Administration raised an
initial objection to the wording of Senate Bill 652, which did not clearly
exempt state projects underway prior to the effective date of the legisla-
tion.4 In response, the Senate Judiciary III Committee5 attached an
amendment to the bill on May 10, 1979,6 and ten days later the General
Assembly ratified the four bills without any further opposition. The
Historic Preservation and Conservation Agreements Act, enacted with-
out controversy and of apparently little interest to those considering the
1. Barret v. State, 220 N.Y. 423, 428, 116 N.E. 99, 101 (1917).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-34 to -42 (Supp. 1979).
3. Id. § 160A-241, -395 to -339.13 (Supp. 1979).
4. Memorandum to Mr. Joseph W. Grimsley from J.K. Sherron (April 3, 1979). The memo
reads:
Senate Bill 652 sponsored by Senators Barnes and Raynor was introduced April 5th, and
referred to the Senate Judiciary Ill Committee.
The proposed legislation, if enacted, would require that the State obtain a 'certificate of
appropriateness' from a 'historic district commission,' planning commission, or similar organ-
ization before either renovation or altering the exterior of any structure designated as having
historical significance.
The existing plan for the Blount Street Historic District as well as other plans previously
adopted for other historical districts located throughout the State would be negated, and any
alterations, renovations, etc. would be subject to approval by various local historic district
commissions.
It is my feeling that when undertaking projects of this magnitude, a cooperative effort is
more conducive to the communities' interest than is the unilateral approach promoted by
Senate Bill 652.
For the above-stated reasons, it is my recommendation that the bill be amended so as to
exclude the State from the provisions of this Act.
5. The members of the Senate Judiciary III Committee were: Henson Barnes (Goldsboro),
Cecil Hill (Brevard), Jim Edwards (Granite Falls), George Marion (Dobson), T. Cass Ballenger
(Hickory), Kathy Sebo (Greensboro), Larry Leake (Ashville), and Willis Whichard (Durham).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-398.1 (Supp. 1979).
The pertinent part reads: "No provision of the Part shall be applicable to the construction, use,
alteration, moving or demolition of buildings by the State of North Carolina, its agencies and
instrumentalities, or institutions of higher education."
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package, was perhaps the most significant legislative action taken by
the 1979 session of the legislature.
The Act will introduce a measure of certainty into the uncertainty
which has long characterized North Carolina property law with respect
to deed restrictions. Such restrictions can provide an effective means of
land use control through private agreement.7 The Act's terms are es-
sentially those of a draft law presently under consideration by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
8
The stated purpose of the Act, as submitted to the Senate Judiciary
III Committee, is as follows:
[T]o principally benefit the Historic Preservation Fund of North Caro-
lina and local revolving funds to better secure the enforcement of vari-
ous 'less-than-fee' approaches to historic preservation by way of deed
restrictions and covenants. The Act will also be useful to local historic
properties commissions which become involved in the purchase and
sale of historic properties in the fashion of a private revolving fund (a
function already authorized by statute). 9
Property law in North Carolina, adhering as it does to English com-
mon-law precepts historically generated by the needs of a long-aban-
doned feudal system, is at its worst anomalous and fraught with
complexities. Yet, it is a law that has evolved through centuries of ex-
perience, and may represent, even today, policies with respect to the
ownership and use of land which preclude its being totally abandoned
and replaced by a statutory scheme-a scheme that would be based on
an amorphous concept of the role which property law must play to ef-
fectuate not just present, but future policies of ownership and land use
in the state. The issue is whether, and to what extent, the legislature is
justified in modifying the existing common law with respect to real
property, thereby paying heed to policies that may be inconsistent with
those which gave rise to the existing law.
Only two general areas of property law are affected by the Agree-
7. Uniform Conservation and Historic Preservation Easement Act, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Draft-for Discussion Only, Dec. 21, 1979), § 1, Com-
ment.
The comment reads in part:
Conservation and historic preservation easements under the terms of the Act may be cre-
ated without the approval of any public agency. There are both philosophical and practical
reasons for not imposing such a requirement. The purpose of the Act is to sweep away cer-
tain common law defenses which would otherwise be available in the case of easements held
in gross. It is not its purpose to impose a public ordering system. . . . If it is the intention to
facilitate private transactions to serve the ends of land conservation and historic preservation,
the requirement of public agency approval adds a layer of complexity which may discourage
private action.
8. d.
9. Explanation from the Attorney General's Select Committee on Historic Preservation
Legislation (to accompany Proposed Historic Preservation and Conservation Agreements Act,
1979).
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ments Act.0 They are 1) property rights in the land of others (specifi-
cally easements), and 2) private restrictions on the use of lands
(specifically reverter rights and restrictive covenants). Each will be the
subject of study in this paper.
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE LANDS OF OTHERS-EASEMENTS
An easement is a non-possessory interest which one individual has in
the land of another for a limited purpose." Easements can be charac-
terized as affirmative' 2 or negative, 13 appurtenant 14 or in gross.' 5 Be-
cause the owner of a preservation easement has an interest in
preserving some aspect of a piece of land or a structure situated on the
land, his interest is typically in the nature of a negative easement.
What the easement holder "owns" is a right to prevent the possessor of
land from doing acts upon the land which, if it were not for the ease-'
ment, he would be privileged to do. The holder of a preservation ease-
ment most often will own no land to which the benefit of the easement
attaches. This interest is one personal to him and therefore his ease-
ment is in gross. The law concerning easements in gross in North Car-
olina is well established; such easements are neither assignable nor
inheritable, and they terminate with the death of the grantee.' 6
One traditional policy of real property law has been to favor the free
alienability of land in order to promote its maximum use. 17 Restric-
10. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(3) (Supp. 1979).
The section states in part: "A 'preservation agreement' means a right, whether or not stated in
the form of a restriction, reservation, easement, covenant, condition or otherwise, in any deed, will
or other instrument executed by or on behalf of the owner of the land .... "
Thus the Act contemplates those rights traditionally viewed as restrictions in the form of ease-
ments, covenants, or reverter rights.
11. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
12. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 451, Comment a (1944). An affirmative easement is one
which entitles the owner to do acts which, were it not for the existence of the easement, he would
not be privileged to do.
13. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 452, Comment a (1944). A negative easement is one
which entitles the owner to limit or prohibit the possessor of the land from doing acts which, were
it not for the existence of the easement, the possessor of the land would be privileged to do.
14. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 453, Comment b (1944). An easement appurtenant is one
which has been created to benefit .the owner of the easement in his physical use or enjoyment of
some tract of land owned by him (a dominant estate).
15. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 454, Comment a (1944). An easement in gross is one
which has been created solely to benefit the owner of the easement personally, irrespective and
independent of his ownership of any tract of land. See also Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 454,
133 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1963). "An easement in gross is not appurtenant to any estate in land and
does not belong to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate in other land, but is a mere
personal interest in or right to use the land of another .
16. Davis v. Robinson, 189 N.C. 589, 127 S.E. 697 (1925).
17. Id. at 597, 127 S.E. at 702. The case offers the traditional view on the favored policy of
free alienability. The opinion states in part:
Land is becoming more and more an object of daily commerce, and its uses are changing with
varying needs and wants of society. Inventions and new wants reflect themselves in the uses
3
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tions against the alienability of easements in gross are justified on simi-
lar policy grounds. The existence of an easement restricts or in some
way limits the landowner's use of the burdened or servient estate. Un-
like an easement appurtenant, there is no corresponding benefit to a
dominant tract of land. The use granted by an easement in gross does
not enhance the economic value of another interest in land, but inures
to the personal satisfaction of the easement holder. Absent the symme-
try of a burden/benefit analysis, a decrease in the use made by the
landowner of a servient estate could exceed the use made by the owner
of the easement. Thus, restrictions on the alienability of an easement
in gross contribute to maximum use of land by forcing an early termi-
nation-within one lifetime. 8
The North Carolina legislature, through the Agreements Act, aban-
doned the distinction between appurtenant easements and easements in
gross, treating a conservation or preservation easement as an interest in
land which "may be acquired by any holder in the same manner as it
may acquire other interests in land."' 9 The wisdom of extending the
policy for restricting the alienability of easements in gross to an exterior
(facade) easement or other preservation easements can be tested only
by a close examination of these unique interests.
A facade easement may be defined as an easement pertaining to the
facade of a historic structure; it invests a public or private organization
with a property interest in the building's exterior without disturbing
private ownership and control of the interior.2" The scope of the Act,
however, is not limited to those rights acquired for the preservation and
control of exterior features, but extends to include easement rights
prohibiting any or all alterations in interior features, and uses that are
not historically appropriate.2'
Preservation easements do not fit neatly into the usual easement cate-
gories (appurtenant or in gross). The traditional relationship between
grantor and grantee of an easement in gross is personal. The parties
intend that the use and enjoyment of the easement right be so personal
to the easement holder that he alone may make that use, 22 and in this
sense the restrictions on alienability accepted at common law are justi-
fied.
of land, and it is for the best interest of the public that the free and unrestricted use shall be
enjoyed, unless such use is restricted in a reasonable manner consistent with the public wel-
fare.
18. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 490, Comment a (1944). A commercial easement in gross,
because it is deemed to contribute to some overall economic value, is generally excepted from the
non-alienability rule.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-38(3)(b) (Supp. 1979).
20. H-866 Op. ATT'Y GEN. (Tex. 1976).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(3) (Supp. 1979).
22. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 492, Comment to Clause (a)(1944).
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It would be wrong, however, to assume that a historical commission,
revolving fund, or government agency 2 3 share those attributes of purely
personal needs or motivations conceived at common law as characteris-
tic of the holder of an easement in gross. The easement they might
hold is intended as a legal device to protect and preserve historic
landmarks. The rights and interests created by this easement are
viewed more properly as belonging to the public in general. Perhaps,
too, the policy favoring the free alienability of interests in land to en-
courage development should be extended, as a counterbalancing mech-
anism, to encourage preservation and conservation through easements
in gross. As such, the "burdens" imposed on the land subject to the
easement are no longer considered as restrictions on the free use of
land, but as societal benefits contributing to an overall plan of both
growth and preservation.
The Agreements Act will not validate those easements which were
created before the passage of the Act.24 Without benefit of statute, the
North Carolina courts, however, might consider recognizing preserva-
tion easements as unique creations deserving unique treatment.25
Should a dispute arise as to the enforceability of a preservation ease-
ment in gross created prior to the Act, the same policies expressed by
the Act could determine the court's ruling.26
In order to assure the continued life of an easement traditionally
viewed as in gross (that is, to build a body of case law to support a
policy of enforceability), several precautionary measures can be taken
at the creation of a preservation easement. 27 Where the easement
holder is a private corporation or charitable organization, the grantee
organization can stipulate that the interest shall pass to an appropriate
named state agency should the present grantee cease to exist. While
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(2) (Supp. 1979). The section defines "Holder" as "any public
body of this State, including the State, any of its agencies, any city, county, district or other politi-
cal subdivision or municipal or public corporation, or any instrumentality of any of the foregoing,
any nonprofit corporation or trust, or any private corporation or business entity ....
24. Uniform Conservation and Historic Preservation Easement Act, supra note 7, at Sec. 6,
Comment. The drafters state that "[rietroactive validation of property interests that were invalid
when created might raise troublesome issues under the taking and contract clauses of the federal
and individual state constitutions."
25. In many states, modem case law has approached the subject of the validity and enforce-
ability of less-than-fee interests more liberally. North Carolina cases, holding consistently to the
requirements for assignment or inheritability of easements, represent a somewhat antiquated, and
very traditional adherence to English common law. It might be suggested that rather than an
unwillingness to change, the courts of the state have yet to perceive a need for change.
26. For advantages of preservation easements see Comment, Alternatives to Destruction.- Two
New Developments in Historic Preservation, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 719, 737 (1979). The ease-
ment permits the preservation of a historic property at a fraction of the cost of acquisition of full
ownership. The holder of the easement is not encumbered with costs of operation and mainte-
nance of the property. The property, because it is held privately, remains on the tax rolls.
27. Id. at 741, 743.
5
Rippon: The North Carolina Historic Preservation and Conservation Agreeme
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1980
HISTORIC PRESER VA TION
that stipulation simply purports to authorize a transfer of rights, pro-
hibited at common law, the hybrid nature of a preservation easement
28
might, to a court willing to uphold the validity of the easement (now
mandated by the Act), suggest a continued life for the easement.
Of equal importance, especially if the courts are to rule on the valid-
ity of a preservation easement without the mandate of the Act, 29 are
both the consideration which has passed in exchange for the grant of
the easement and the nature of the easement itself. Thus the donation
of a historic preservation easement should be accompanied by at least
token compensation, as the likelihood that the easement will be upheld
increases when consideration is given. Also, inasmuch as the courts
have had fewer problems recognizing novel easements that impose af-
firmative rather than negative obligations, the prohibitive provisions of
the easement should be cast in affirmative, as well as negative, lan-
guage.30 For example, the right of the easement holder to prevent the
landowner from altering the outside brick exterior of the building in a
way inconsistent with its present state, can also be worded to impose a
duty on the landowner to maintain the exterior features in a way con-
sistent with its present state.
Easements for preservation purposes will generally be confined to
those characteristically described as facade easements. However, the
Agreements Act has, by its terms, a broader scope, and its purview will
extend to easement rights in the alteration of interior features and uses
not historically appropriate. 3'
While certain modifications in existing property law may be justified
in the use of facade easements, the broader scope of the statute presents
another issue. The restrictions on interior alterations and use create
greater burdens than those imposed by facade easements. Without a
corresponding benefit to land owned by the easement holder, the bur-
den may outweigh a more nebulous benefit to society or to land owners
adjacent to the burdened property. 32 It would seem that those policy
28. The preservation easement could be viewed as analogous to a commercial easement in
gross.
29. The Agreements Act can be amended or repealed.
30. See Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation through Recorded
Land-Use.Agreements, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 540, 561 (1979). Although negative ease-
ments appear to be less favored than affirmative ones, for purposes of remedies a negative ease-
ment is more likely to be enforced by injunction. Enforcement of an affirmative easement by
mandatory injunction would impose on a court the duty of supervision, and a responsibility that
courts generally strive to avoid.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(3) (Supp. 1979).
32. Brenneman, Techniques/or Controlling the Surroundings ofHistoric Sites, 36 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 416, 419 (1971). The author suggests that a private person or government agency
owning neighboring land and who may have special interests in the maintenance of a historic
property can negotiate for himself the purchase of an easement right, thus making the easement
appurtenant to his property and enforceable. The availability of this alternative makes less tena-
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considerations justifying the restrictions on the alienability of an ease-
ment in gross which favor early termination, should, in these circum-
stances, be given greater weight. Thus, those who wish the continued
advantage of the Agreements Act might be cautioned to exercise re-
straint in imposing controls which will unduly burden the use of land,
for this may ultimately defeat their purposes. Envision, for example, a
situation where a landowner, in exchange for considerable financial
gain to himself, conveys an exterior, interior, and use easement to a
private organization interested in preserving the structure as is in a
neighborhood which subsequently alters in character. To the land-
owner's heirs the structure is burdened by the imposition requiring
them to maintain the interior, exterior, and use of the structure as origi-
nally contemplated; it is also essentially valueless in its present condi-
tion and use in a neighborhood materially altered by time and
circumstances.
An illustration of the possible long-term detrimental effects of an
easement in gross which is valid into perpetuity can be developed
through a discussion of property tax assessments. Easement rights are
reflected in property tax adjustments.33 Where the easement is one ap-
purtenant, the lower adjustment to the property burdened is balanced
by an upward adjustment for the property benefiting from the ease-
ment. The effect is one of equalization, and revenues neither increase
or decrease.34 Easements in gross, however, tend to detract from the
overall tax base as the upward adjustment on benefited property is not
available.35 With the exception of commercial easements in gross,
which are viewed as economically beneficial to the public in general,
the imbalance is short-lived as the easement by definition terminates
with attempts to transfer or with the death or extinction of the
grantee/holder.
Clearly, the Agreements Act, by authorizing the enforcements of
easements in gross, creates a perpetual imbalance and a concomitantly
long-term decline in property tax revenues. By foregoing a given
amount of tax revenue, the county or municipality is, in effect, making
ble the argument that adjacent landowners have a special interest in preserving not just the exte-
rior, but the interior and use of a structure when the easement is in gross and held by an outside
agency or organization.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-40 (Supp. 1979). The provision states: "For purposes of taxation,
land and improvements subject to a conservation or preservation agreement shall be assessed on
the basis of the true value of the land and improvements less any reduction in value, caused by the
agreement."
34. For a thorough discussion and criticism of the widely accepted practice of adjusting prop-
erty tax assessments for easements, see Menikoff, Taxation of Restricted Use of Property.- A Theo-
retical Framework, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 419 (1978).
35. Only a private corporation or organization for profit would be subject to property tax on
the easement interest.
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a tax expenditure. Facade easements rights alone, however, generally
result in only slight downward adjustments. In fact, where the property
has been designated as historically significant, the designation may
tend to increase the overall value of the property. More extensive ease-
ment restrictions on an isolated piece of property, whose fair market
value may be greatly increased were it not so encumbered by the ease-
ment, may significantly reduce its property tax valuation. By authoriz-
ing the validity of in gross easements subject only to termination by
agreement,16 the Agreements Act not only relegates property to less
than its highest and best use, but condones what could be a significant
reduction in property tax revenues.
Absent in the Agreements Act are provisions for termination of ease-
ments or other preservation restrictions. The drafters of the Act admit
their intent to exclude the possibility of termination entirely when not
specified in writing.37 The Act provides only for termination upon ex-
press agreement between the parties or as stipulated at the time of crea-
tion.38
It is interesting to note, however, that the Uniform Act upon which
the North Carolina Act is based does include provisions for modifica-
tion and termination.39 Specifically, the Uniform Act addresses itself to
situations where the parties are unable to agree on terms for modifica-
tion or termination. In these circumstances the question is to be re-
solved by the court, which is required to adhere to certain guidelines set
forth in the statute.4" The Uniform Act's provisions would apply a
more stringent test to the common law doctrine of changed condi-
tions,4' yet they would broaden the scope of the doctrine to extend also
to easements. In addition, the provisions allow a court to award dam-
ages to the holder of the easement in the event of termination. Had a
charitable organization paid a considerable sum for the easement
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-41(b) (Supp. 1979).
37. Interview with Myrick Howard, Exec. Dir. Historic Preservation Fund of North Caro-
lina, Inc., and Keith Morgan, N.C. Div. of Archives & History, in Raleigh, N.C. (Feb. 14, 1980).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-41(b) (Supp. 1979). The provision states: "Releases or termina-
tions of such agreements shall be recorded in the same waiver. Releases or terminations, or the
recording entry, shall appropriately identify by date, parties, and book and pages of recording, the
agreement which is the subject of the release or termination."
39. Uniform Conservation and Historic Preservation Easement Act, supra note 7, at § 3.
40. Id. § 3(b). The statute states in part:
The court may modify or terminate the easement only if the petitioner establishes that the
easement no longer substantially achieves the conservation or historic preservation purpose
for which it was established. In the case of modification, the petitioner must also show that
the requested change is no greater than necessary to cure the claimed deficiency of the ease-
ment. The court shall not modify or terminate an easement that continues to serve the pur-
pose for which it was established even though public land use and planning objectives would
be facilitated thereby unless continued enforcement of the easement according to its terms
would violate a fundamental public policy of the state.
41. See text accompanying notes 74-75 infra.
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rights, and the value of the property without the easement was consid-
erably more than as encumbered, a court would be justified in award-
ing the easement holder damages for the involuntary surrender of his
rights.
In the absence of specific provisions regarding the modification or
termination of preservation easements, the North Carolina courts may
look to existing common law to support a decision to terminate. As-
suming that for preservation purposes the easements are in gross, a
court may, for example, terminate under the cessation of purpose doc-
trine.42 A broad interpretation of the doctrine suggests that where the
purpose of a preservation easement is to preserve the integrity of a par-
ticular structure, and the cultural, aesthetic, economic, or social condi-
tions upon which those values have been based no longer exist, the
purpose of the easement and the easement itself would cease to exist.
Fulfilling the purpose of its creation, the maintenance of a structure of
then historical or architectural significance, cannot justify continued
maintenance should the structure cease to be significant due to change
in the concept of what constitutes "significance." Historical or archi-
tectural significance is an essentially subjective judgment dependent on
what the society values at a particular time.
Easements may also be terminated by abandonment.43 Should an
easement holder, the governmental agency, or a private corporation in-
tend to abandon its rights and accompany the intent with an external
act evidencing the intent, the easement will terminate." When the
easement holder reserves a right to enter and inspect the premises and
fails to exercise that right, and the failure to act is accompanied by an
intent to abandon all interest it holds in the preservation of the prop-
erty, a court may hold that the rights are thereby terminated.
An exercise of eminent domain can terminate an easement.45 If a
governmental agency acquires a preservation easement, the Act does
not preclude another governmental agency from exercising a power of
eminent domain to acquire the land and easement for other purposes.46
Should the easement holder be a private organization, government may
exercise its power of eminent domain; the taking, however, must be
accompanied by just compensation.
42. Railroad v. Way, 172 N.C. 774,'90 S.E. 937 (1916); J. WEBSTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA § 301 (1971).
43. J. WEBSTER, supra note 42, at § 303.
44. Miller v. Teer, 320 N.C. 605, 18 S.E.2d 173 (1941).
45. J. WEBSTER, supra note 42, at § 308.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-36(c) (Supp. 1979).
9
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PRIVATE RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF LAND CONDITIONS
(A) Possibility of Reverter and Power of Termination.
"A possibility of reverter is an untransferred potential residuum of
an estate remaining in a grantor and his heirs or in a devisor's heirs
when an estate of fee simple determinable is created in real property
either by deed or will."47 By using appropriate words such as "until"
the event occurs or "while," "during," or "so long as" the property is
used for a stated purpose, the grantor can indicate that the fee simple
will expire automatically upon the happening of the stated event. A
possibility of reverter operates automatically to revest the fee simple
interest in the grantor or his heirs. It requires neither the institution of
a lawsuit, nor the intervention of any court. 8
A power of termination arises after the creation of a possessory estate
known as a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. The fee re-
mains vested in the grantee "on the condition that," or "provided that,"
the land be used for a stated purpose, or it will be "rendered null and
void" if the stated condition is subsequently breached. The power to
terminate and revest the possessory estate in the grantor or his heirs is
not automatic. It requires a positive action. The grantor must either
effectuate actual entry upon the land or bring an action at law.49
The Agreements Act authorizes the use of reverter rights as a means
to control the preservation and use of historic properties. The reverter
clause is effective insurance that the special conditions included in a
deed of sale or transfer will be complied with. It provides for the return
of the land to the grantor if the grantee does not honor the conditions."
Reverter rights, however, have not been widely used as a preserva-
tion mechanism in North Carolina: They have practical uses under
circumstances which are limited. The grantor, in imposing conditions
on the use of the land he conveys, becomes a private land-use planner.
It is he who determines to what use the land may be put and whether it
will be the most productive, profitable, or socially desirable. 52 Reverter
clauses are an effective means of preserving the private control of land.
Possibilities of reverter and power of termination are also alienable by
both inter vivos conveyance and by will.5 3 Thus the Agreements Act
has no significant effect on the enforceability of reverter rights.
47. Webster, The Questfor Clear Land Titles-Whither Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of
Entry', 42 N.C.L. REV. 807, 809 (1963-64).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 810.
50. Id.
51. See generally interviews cited note 37 supra.
52. See Webster, supra note 47, at 808.
53. J. WEBSTER, supra note 42, at § 345 n. 11. "Under North Carolina law since the adoption
10
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Reverter rights have also been harshly criticized as being unreasona-
ble impediments to the free alienability and usability of land,54 and the
courts, consequently, do not favor them.
Since restrictions created by such conditions operate so harshly and
may terminate vested fee simple estates, the courts do not lightly con-
strue a clause in a deed as a condition subsequent which qualifies or
limits the duration of the estate conveyed thereby, unless the clause
clearly expresses in 'apt and appropriate language' the intention of the
parties to that effect. A mere statement of the purpose for which the
land is to be used, without more is not sufficient to create a condition.55
The limited use of reverter rights to preserve historic properties may
thus be explained at three levels. First, the conditions originate upon
the grant of a fee and are accomplished therefore only by a conveyance
of land. Apart from individual landowners who wish to take the pres-
ervation initiative, only an organization such as the Historic Preserva-
tion Fund of North Carolina, Inc. would be in a position to effectively
use a reverter right clause. As most frequently is the case with endan-
gered properties of historic or architectural significance, a revolving
fund provides the only means to accomplish what the landowner will
not do-further diminish the value of his property by imposing a harsh
reverter clause.
Second, with a view toward the ultimate goals of the preservation
movement, a reverter clause may in fact be more negative than positive
in effect. Its validity will not be upheld if the conditions are vague and
unspecified. For example, "for use as an historic property" would not
suffice to meet the test of specificity. Yet to anticipate the particular
conditions which could justify an exercise of a reverter right is virtually
impossible when dealing with historic properties. 6
The third factor contributing to the limited use of reverter clauses is
the general inappropriateness of the remedy. Whether automatically or
by court action, the property re-vests in the grantor. The result may
serve to prevent the unauthorized use, alteration or demolition of the
structure; however, a revolving fund, for example, would then be bur-
dened with the added aggravation and expense of dealing with the
same property each time the conditions were broken.
Reverter clauses can be effective penalty devices for breach of cove-
nants. The Historic Preservation Fund of North Carolina, Inc., for ex-
ample, provides for possibility of reverter for three years following
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3 in 1961, rights of entry for condition broken and possibilities of
reverter are assignable both before and after breach of the condition."
54. J. WEBSTER, supra note 42, at § 345.
55. Id.
56. A deed would have to specify with some particularity the acts which would result in a
breach of condition. For example, part of the clause might read, "as long as the grantee maintains
the exterior or affects repairs in yellow pine of five inch diameter, painted white with black trim."
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conveyance, should the grantee not comply with extensive convenants
in the deed.57 Viewed as a precautionary measure to assure the good
faith intentions of the grantee to comply, a reverter clause is neither
harsh nor unreasonably restrictive on the long-term future use of land.
However, the reverter right now ceases to be independent, depending
for its validity on the enforceability of the covenants. In this respect the
Agreements Act becomes vitally important in insuring that all cove-
nants will be upheld as against the present purchaser or his successors
in interest.
(B) Covenants
A covenant is a promissory obligation arising out of and respecting
the use of land. 8 Covenants, in order to be valid and enforceable,
must be in writing since they constitute interests in land analogous to
negative easements. 9 The grantor of land may set forth the covenant
restrictions in a deed of conveyance, and covenants can be enforceable
at law or in equity. In order to be enforceable at law, a covenant must
"run with the land"; that is, the covenant must conform to rigid com-
mon-law requirements of form, intent, privity, and substance. 60 Cove-
nants which do not meet the test of running with the land are termed
covenants in gross and are treated in much the same fashion as ease-
ments in gross.6
English courts refused to permit the burden of a covenant in gross to
run with the land. In addition, a majority of American courts deny the
enforcement of covenants in a court of law where the benefit is in
gross, 62 and the benefit is not assignable and will end with the original
covenantee.63 The rules are consistent with those respecting the non-
recognition of easements in gross, and the policy issues are similar.
The Restatement of Property takes the following position, endorsing
that policy:
The imposition, by virtue of his succession, of an obligation as a prom-
isor upon the successor of one who has made a promise respecting the
use of his land creates a burden upon the ownership of the land of the
promisor which may have a disadvantageous effect upon its use and
development. There is a social interest in the utilization of land. That
social interest is adversely affected by burdens placed on the ownership
of land . . . . Unless a burden has some compensating advantage
which prevents it from being on the whole a deterrent to land use and
57. See generaly interviews cited note 37 supra.
58. J. WEBSTER, supra note 42, at § 346(a).
59. Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C. 240, 241, 84 S.E.2d 892, 898 (1954).
60. 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 672-75 (Supp. 1979-80).
61. London County Council v. Allen, 3 K.B. 642 (1914).
62. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.13 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
63. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 534, 537 (1944).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1980], Art. 14
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol11/iss2/14
374 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
development, the running of the promise by which it was created is not
permitted. The requirement of such a compensating advantage is com-
monly expressed by saying that the promise must 'touch and concern'
the land with which it runs.64
Thus, uses inhibited by the covenant (burden imposed) must be offset
by a benefit to the promisee or a beneficiary of the promise respecting
the physical use and enjoyment of land possessed by him.
The nature of covenants imposed for the preservation of structures
precludes enforcement at law where the beneficiary of the promise is a
state agency or other organization possessed of no land to which the
benefit of the promise may run. An additional consideration respecting
the utility of creating a covenant at law is that the remedy for breach of
a covenant is in the form of damages, unless it is shown that the remedy
would be inadequate.65 Where money damages do not constitute an
adequate substitute for the loss of the promised benefit, an injunction
requiring performance may be granted.66 Inadequacy of a remedy at
law, however, is not determinative of the question of whether an in-
junction will be granted. A court, in its discretion, may deny injunctive
relief if it deems the action to be prohibited, unnecessarily burdensome,
or disproportionate to the benefit resulting from the enforcement of the
promise.6" In short, even if it were possible to characterize a preserva-
tion covenant as one running with the land, and therefore enforceable
at law, the remedies are uncertain and possibly ineffective to achieve
the desired preservation goal. For assuming that money damages were
the remedy, property rights would tend to evolve to more highly valued
uses should the gain from breach exceed the damages to be paid. An
injunction would make such a change less likely.
In order to ameliorate the harshness of the rigid requirements re-
specting covenants enforceable at law, a more modem trend has been
to grant equitable relief if the promisor has notice of the restrictions.68
Termed equitable servitudes, covenants enforced in equity are most
frequently of value in enabling landowners who are strangers to each
other's titles to enforce the restrictions. Generally the benefit of the
servitude "touches and concerns" the land of the individual asking for
enforcement. Privity of estate between promisor and promisee is not
required. There is some doubt, however, that the burden of an equita-
ble servitude will run when the benefit is in gross.69 Moreoever, of the
few cases dealing with the assignability of servitudes in gross, most
64. Id. § 537, Comment a.
65. Id. § 528.
66. Id. Comment e.
67. Id. Comment f.
68. Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
69. Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971); Craven County v. First-
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 503, 75 S.E.2d 620, 621, (1953).
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agree that the benefit of an equitable servitude cannot be assigned.7"
All covenants, whether characterized as covenants at law or equita-
ble servitudes, whether they touch and concern the land or are in gross,
are valid and enforceable under the Agreements Act.7 Of particular
significance is the certainty that servitudes in gross, those which enable
a revolving fund or preservation society or government agency to con-
trol the use and exterior appearance of an historic structure, can be
assured of the future effectiveness of that control. It can also be as-
sumed that the benefit of the servitude can be assigned, which would
enable a private corporation to assign its rights to a government
agency, should the corporation cease to exist at a future time.
The Agreements Act also provides for remedies in the form of equi-
table relief, or where appropriate, damages,72 a curious reversal where
the agreement is characterized as a covenant at law and equitable relief
is available only if damages are inappropriate. In effect, the Act has
tailored its provision for remedies to meet the needs of those for whom
the Act was designed.
As with easements, the Act is silent as to terminability of covenants
unless by express agreement between the parties either at the time of
their making or at a subsequent time. In North Carolina, if the creators
of restrictive covenants do not place a limitation on the duration of the
covenants, they have a potentially infinite duration. 73 Equity may re-
fuse to enforce a 'covenant of infinite duration "when there has been a
change of circumstances in the restricted area or a change in the char-
acter of the neighborhood to such an extent that the objectives of the
covenant have in fact been frustrated or made impossible or impracti-
cable of accomplishment. ' ' 74 Changes in the character of land adjacent
to, but outside, an area of a subdivision restricted to residential pur-
poses do not affect the validity of the restriction.75
It appears that should it be the intention of the parties that the re-
strictions be enforced for the purpose of preserving the character of the
neighborhood, and the character of the neighborhood significantly
changes, those purposes would be deemed frustrated and the agreement
unenforceable. Where restrictive covenants are imposed to preserve
the historical or architectural integrity of the individual property, an
argument similar to that made for the termination of easements
70. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND 56, 58-59
n.37 (1967).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-38 (Supp. 1979).
72. Id. § 121-39.
73. J. WEBSTER, supra note 42, at § 346(e).
74. Id.
75. Tull v. Doctors Bldg., Inc., 255 N.C. 23, 120 S.E.2d 817 (1961). But see Elrod v. Phillips,
214 N.C. 472, 199 S.E. 722 (1938).
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emerges. For example, by construing a restricted area to mean an area
upon which the property is situated, a change in circumstances would
include an excessive economic burden upon the landowner to comply
with the agreement in light of a change in values with respect to main-
taining the property as a historical landmark.
New to property tax assessors is the requirement of the Act that any
reduction in the value of the land caused by an agreement in the form
of covenant or condition be considered in valuation.76 Whereas ease-
ments have traditionally been considered in adjusting value for prop-
erty tax purposes, covenants and conditions have not.7 7 A similar
problem is thus presented as was discussed with respect to easements in
gross when the agreement involves an equitable servitude in gross or
reverter rights.78 Conceivably there will be a downward adjustment
with no compensatory upward adjustment for personal benefits re-
ceived. It is impossible to predict at this point how the existence of a
preservation agreement in the form of a promise made to an organiza-
tion or agency exempt from property taxation will affect the value of
the property so encumbered. A significant drop in value could be
viewed as symptomatic of the changed circumstances that would pre-
clude a court of equity from upholding the validity of the agreement.
PRIVATE VS. PUBLIC LAND USE PLANNING
The use of preservation restrictions in the form of easements, cove-
nants, or reverter rights, as an alternative to zoning or the exercise of
eminent domain, has received widespread endorsement. Most attrac-
tive are the arguments that government bureaucracy plays no role in a
private contract between two individuals,79 that the private sector is
given an opportunity to voluntarily regulate land use,80 and that con-
trol can be individualized to a particular parcel of land.8'
Two issues emerge, both of which suggest that the Agreements Act
does not statutorily endorse a completely private agreement approach
to preservation restrictions. The first is that the Act authorizes state
and municipal agencies to acquire easement rights, and to impose cove-
nant or reverter right restrictions. 82 An easement right, if purchased, is
paid for with taxpayer dollars. Assuming that a state, or particularly a
municipal government, is responsive to the needs and wishes of the
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-40 (Supp. 1979).
77. See Menikoff, supra note 34.
78. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
79. See Brenneman, supra note 32, at 417.
80.' Beckwith, Developments in the Law afHistoric Preservation anda Reflection on Liberty, 12
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 93, 142 (1976).
81. See Brenneman, supra note 32, at 417.
82. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(2) (Supp. 1979) & note 23 supra.
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voter/taxpayer, this delegation of authority to acquire easements, while
a function of the political machinery, is not objectionable. When pri-
vate preservation organizations, in varying degrees, are governmentally
subsidized, they acquire easement rights either wholly or in part with
public funds. A private organization may also use public funds to re-
volve properties encumbered with covenants. Here there is a shift of
decisionmaking unaccompanied by political safeguards.8 3 There is
control only to the extent that government may withhold funds or im-
pose conditions of limited regulation and supervision."4 A private pres-
ervation organization, supported primarily by donations from a select
group of preservation enthusiasts, may be least responsive to the tax-
payer whose dollars provide additional funding.
A second and more realistic approach to the use of private controls
for preservation purposes is an acknowledgment that it is, in fact, an
alternative method for public agencies to carry out their programs.
Where public agencies have been delegated the responsibility for pres-
ervation programs, they have traditionally exercised that responsiblity
through police power (zoning) controls85 or through purchase or con-
demnation (eminent domain).,6 Arguably, by removing common law
limitations on interests in gross, it is now possible to encourage plan-
ning on a co-operative level between the private sector and the public
agency. The ultimate issue is whether the private landowner's volun-
tary acquiescence to the agreement can justify the absence of procedu-
ral safeguards necessary to a states' legitimate exercise of a planning
and regulatory function.
POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS
The significance of the Act in providing a new legal tool whereby
public agencies may contract with a private individual to achieve pres-
ervation goals surfaces most readily in dealing with conflicting policy
judgments. Any landowner may, at any time, agree privately to the
imposition of restrictions upon his land. The nature and duration of
83. The rules which govern permissible lawmaking insist on the assurance of a policy's pro-
mulgation by a sufflcienty accountable body. Thus a group of private citizens exercising delegated
authority in an open-ended way within the community is not permissible. See Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-17 (1978).
84. See generally interviews cited note 37 supra. The Revolving Fund of North Carolina,
Inc. received two challenge grants of $50,000 each in its first two years of operation. It was re-
quired to purchase and re-sell $100,000 worth of property in each year and the properties were to
be appraised according to Federal Uniform appraisal standards at a cost of $750 to $1,500 for each
appraisal. Although not unduly burdensome, the requirements illustrate the role of government
in "private" agreements.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1976).
86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-241 (Supp. 1979).
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these restrictions have, in the past, been subject to limitation for two
reasons.
The decision to create an interest in gross need not be reasonable;
that is, it need not be economically practical or socially beneficial. In
these terms, reasonableness requires that there be a corresponding ben-
efit in return for the burden or restriction. Common law has consist-
ently held that one cannot restrict, indefinitely, the development of
land when the possibility (probability) of an unreasonable agreement
exists.
Yet if reasonableness is measured in terms of land management
rather than land development, in gross interests provide public agen-
cies and private landowners with a means to conserve environmental
values and preserve historical and cultural landmarks. Indeed, the past
decade has been one of awareness and shifting values: an awareness
that our resources are limited, new values recommending permanency
over change. Growth policies have taken on new directions as a slow-
ing economy emphasizes the need for introspection, deacceleration,
and more careful planning. The conservation and preservation move-
ment is largely representative of an effort to inject a measure of conser-
vatism into a society which conditions progress on urban and industrial
development. If the Agreements Act is viewed as a viable tool to
achieve the stabilization of land use by enforcing restrictions against
change, the in gross interests held as a result of the Act become inher-
ently reasonable.
It should be cautioned that the decision to raise the status of in gross
interests is based on a value judgment; it is based on the assumption
that it is socially and economically desirable to preserve, adapt, and re-
use. Moreover, as the Act extends its scope only to agreements between
an individual promisor and an agency or organization as promisee, the
values espoused are not necessarily those of the private sector. The
individual landowner who covenants with a governmental agency to do
or refrain from doing certain acts on his property may ultimately be
bowing to what is yet another bureaucratic decision.
A second rationale for common-law limitations on the duration of in
gross interests was an absence of recording acts. Whereas it was possi-
ble to identify the holder of an easement appurtenant or a covenant
which benefited an adjacent or nearby parcel of land, it was undoubt-
edly more difficult, before the modem recording acts, to determine
who, if anyone, held an in gross interest. If alienable, the danger of an
interest in gross becoming an unreasonable encumbrance on the title
would increase with the difficulty of locating the holder of the interest.
The Agreements Act expressly provides for the preservation agree-
17
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ment to be recorded in the same manner as deeds.87 Recording pro-
tects a grantee from claims of other purchasers for value or
encumbrances; hence, there is little doubt that deed containing pres-
ervation restrictive covenants, or a deed granting an easement, will be
recorded by the grantee. As to the original parties to the agreement,
recordation insures that subsequent purchasers of the land subject to
the restriction will be notified by title search of the nature and holder of
the restriction. As the Agreements Act has limited its definition of a
holder to government agency, private corporation, or business entity,
88
the difficulty of locating holders of an in gross interest is minimized to
the extent that the agency or organization is likely to remain in exist-
ence and in a known location for as long as the interest is in existence.
Recording acts favor the possibility of viewing interests in gross as
alienable, at least where it serves a public policy to do so.
EFFECT OF RECORDING ACTS
In North Carolina, the Marketable Title Act 89 became fully opera-
tive on October 1, 1976.90 As easements and covenants created by au-
thority of the Agreements Act are not of the type excluded by the
Marketable Title Act, it may be possible to circumvent the purposes of
the latter Act by taking advantage of the former. A covenantor, gran-
tor of an easement, or his or her assigns, for example, could convey the
burdened property without including in the deed any restriction. As-
suming the deed is recorded and no action is taken upon it for thirty
years, any conflicting claims based on a prior transaction with respect
to that title are extinguished.
It might also be argued that, having recorded the deed without re-
striction, the owner-grantee possesses under color of title and may
claim adversely to the entire interest granted, as against an individual
in seven years, and as against the state in twenty-one years. 9' Under
color of title, the adverse possessor, if he has actual possession of some
part of the land, will be the constructive possessor of the remaining
land or interest described in the deed, if the land involved is adequately
described. 92
A court of equity, in determining whether to enjoin a subsequent
purchaser from action in derogation of the covenants or restriction not
found in his deed, would be required to comply with the provisions of
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-41 (Supp. 1979). In North Carolina the recordation statutes are
known as The Connor Act, enacted in 1885. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18, -20 (1976).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(2) (Supp. 1979).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47B-1 to -9 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47B-3 (1976).
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-35, -38 to -40 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
92. J. WEBSTER, supra note 42, at § 264.
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the Marketable Title Act. Whether a court would refuse injunction
under an adverse possession theory is speculative. In order to avoid
either possibility, it would be advisable for any agency to maintain a
system of periodic checks on property in which it has an interest, or to
preserve its interest by registering or re-registering such rights with the
Register of Deeds office so that they will be discoverable in the record
chain of title in the thirty year title search.
VALIDITY OF THE ACT
In A-S-P Associates v. City ofRaleigh,93 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina established an important constitutional precedent concerning
the constitutionality of preservation efforts accomplished through zon-
ing ordinances. Thus the A-S-P case precludes a constitutional attack
on the Act as authorizing a "taking"94 under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The court held that an ordinance based on
aesthetic considerations was a permissible exercise of police power.
Moreover, the Agreements Act, as a tool for achieving preservation
goals, lacks the coerciveness of the traditional exercise of police power.
It does not interfere with the right of two consenting parties to enter
into a private contract with respect to the use of land. It merely extends
those property interests which are the subject matter of the contract.
A more serious question arises with respect to the requirement that
the power delegated by the legislature include standards to guide the
delegated party in its exercise of that power. The requirement pre-
serves constitutional checks, both political and judicial, on the exercise
of governmental authority.95 The issue is whether a court could deter-
mine if the action authorized by the Act is within the scope of the dele-
gated power. Clearly, the legislature intended the Act to extend only to
the conservation or preservation of land, sites, or structures. The his-
toric sites or structures included by the Act are not clearly defined, and
the Act has not specified that they will be recorded on the National
Register of Historic Places.9 6 The 1979 amendment relating to historic
properties authorizes the acquisition of any property that "embodies
important elements of its cultural, social, economic, political or archi-
tectural history . . . .9' Properties subject to the Act, under this defi-
nition, are unlimited. Who is to determine significance, how it is to be
determined, and what limits can be imposed are questions left unan-
93. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
94. In defining a preservation agreement, the Act authorizes "a right ... or in any other
[order] of taking .... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(3) (Supp. 1979).
95. L. TRIBE, supra note 83.
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35 (Supp. 1979). The Act applies to any property that is "histori-
cally significant for its architecture, archaeology or historical associations."
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-399.1(a)(l) (Supp. 1979).
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swered by the Act. In fact, any contract subject to the Act's terms
could, in itself, be voided under the doctrine of mistake should it be
determined by a court that the subject matter of the contract, a purport-
edly significant property, is one not significant within the meaning of
the Act.98 An amendment to the Act or a body of case law interpreting
"significance" might inject some certainty into what is now a serious
weakness. It is certain that any deed conveying a property with preser-
vation restrictions should include sufficient recitals as to what, in fact,
constitutes its significance. A mere label such as Historic Property
Preservation Agreement should not automatically bring the agreement
within the purview of the Act. Recitals would be of particular impor-
tance where a court may, at a later date, be asked to interpret the mean-
ing of "significance" and to measure against its interpretation the
attributes of the property in question.
TAX CONSEQUENCES
The Tax Reform Act of 19769 reflected the policy of government to
encourage the preservation, restoration, and maintenance of historic
structures. Adopting the mechanism used in section 167(k) of the
Code,"° Congress identified a new class of real estate, "certified his-
toric structures," in connection with which rehabilitation expenditures
are eligible for five-year amortization.
Section 167(o),"' another provision dealing with the renovation of
historic properties, offers the taxpayer the alternative of being treated
as an original user of a substantially rehabilitated historic property.
Should the taxpayer elect this treatment, he may use either the 150%
declining balance method of depreciation for nonresidential property,
or the 200% declining balance method or sum-of-the-years' digits
method in cases of residential property.
Section 280(B)10 2 provides that no deduction is allowed for any
amount expended on the demolition of a certified historic property, or
for any loss sustained as a result of the demolition. Not only is the
taxpayer discouraged from the demolition of historic structures, but as
a concomitant to section 280(B), section 167(n)' °3 provides that for real
property constructed on a site that was occupied by a certified historic
98. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 605 (1960 & Supp. 1971); Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568,
33 N.W. 919 (1887).
99. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1042, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.).
100. I.RC. § 167(k).
101. Id. § 167(o).
102. Id. § 280(B).
103. Id. § 167(n).
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structure on or after June 30, 1976, the depreciation allowance be lim-
ited to straight line.
Balanced against these deincentives for demolition or substantial al-
teration, the Code provides, in section 170(f)(3), 1°4 an incentive in the
form of a deduction for contributions of partial interests. Section
170(f)(3), effective for contributions made after June 13, 1977, and
before June 14, 1981, includes an "easement with respect to real prop-
erty granted in perpetuity to an organization described in subsection
(b)(1)(A) exclusively for conservation purposes." Section
170(f)(3)(C)(ii) defines conservation purpose as the "preservation of
historically important land areas or structures." The Code provides a
deduction allowance only for easements granted in perpetuity.
The Agreements Act assists the North Carolina taxpayer in taking
advantage of the tax incentives for preservation. By insuring that an
easement in gross donated for preservation purposes is enforceable into
perpetuity, the Act has insured that those easements fall within the
scope of section 170(0. In fact, in the absence of the Act, it seems un-
likely that any such easement in gross could qualify for a charitable
deduction since by its definition the easement, in North Carolina,
would be extinguished upon an attempt to transfer or with the death of
the easement holder.
For federal income tax purposes, the owner of a historic property is
presently encouraged to consider preservation as an alternative to dem-
olition. The donation of an easement does not preclude the adaptive
re-use of the building as long as the use and proposed renovations are
not inconsistent with the building's historical or architectural integrity.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina is presently one of eight states that has passed legis-
lation to facilitate historic preservation through private agreement. 05
Both the drafting of the Act and its inclusion in the 1979 historic pres-
ervation legislative package speak highly of a few dedicated and capa-
ble preservationists. An act of this nature merits serious consideration
by a legislature contemplating its passage, by preservation groups who
will work with it, by landowners affected by it, by citizens who support
its policies with their tax dollars, and by courts that will be asked to
settle controversies arising from it. A landowner who agrees to convey
104. Id. § 170(0(3).
105. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206 (Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-42a
to -42c (West 1978); GA CODE ANN. §§ 85-1406 to -1410 (1978 & Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:1252 (West Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-33 (West 1977 & Supp.
1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 477:45-47 (Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5 (Supp.
1978).
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or donate an easement, or a purchaser willing to buy property bur-
dened with preservation restrictions is free to do so. It is the balancing
of economics and aesthetics which will ultimately determine whether
that decision will insure the life of the structure long after the death of
its owner.
MICHELLE RIPPON
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